After a short pause, Defense Tech Signals is back. The war with Iran has only reinforced how quickly munitions stockpiles, interceptor demand, and propulsion capacity become strategic issues.

Last Week, we looked at X-Bow Systems and its additive manufacturing approach to the SRM market. It was part 1 of a 2 part series and discussed some of the physics of a solid rocket motor

This week, we turn to Ursa Major, another company using additive manufacturing, but focus on the supply chain constraints of production.

Ursa Major is applying additive manufacturing across liquid engines, solid rocket motors, and complete missile systems.  From the Mk 104 dual-thrust motor that powers portions of the Standard Missile portfolio to the HAVOC hypersonic weapon unveiled in February 2026, the company is attempting to become an independent propulsion supplier for the next generation of U.S. munitions.

Founded in 2015 in Berthoud, Colorado, Ursa Major's vision was to create a "merchant supplier" model for propulsion, allowing vehicle integrators to focus on structures, avionics, and mission management while Ursa Major provided the heart of the system. CEO Joe Laurienti, [SpaceX and Blue Origin], initially focused on liquid engines for the commercial small-satellite launch market.

That changed between 2021 and 2022 as Javelin and Stinger consumption began to outpace production. Ursa Major recognized that its expertise in additive manufacturing and engine design applied directly to SRMs, leading to the development of the Lynx process.

By late 2025, the company closed a $100 million Series E round and entered 2026 with $115 million in bookings. In early 2026, its Draper engine completed an AFRL flight demo, and HAVOC was publicly unveiled shortly after. 

In early 2026, Ursa Major also announced that Chris Spagnoletti would succeed Dan Jablonsky as Chief Executive Officer.

Lynx uses software-driven metallic 3D printing for motor cases and propulsion components, enabling the same line that produces a 2.75-inch motor for APKWS upgrades to produce a 22-inch motor for Standard Missile-class interceptors. 

Ursa Major has also developed Highly Loaded Grain energetic designed to increase energy density in the same physical volume. Company data suggests potential range increases above 30% without enlarging the missile footprint. 

The Navy Mk 104 pathfinder is the highest-priority solid motor program in the portfolio. The Mk 104 is the dual-thrust motor that powers SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6—the Navy's primary shipborne air defense interceptors.

Ursa Major's liquid engine architecture is built on Oxygen-Rich Staged Combustion (ORSC). In 2017, Ursa Major became the first American company to successfully fire an ORSC engine, a cycle previously exclusive to Russian state manufacturers.

Unveiled in February 2026, HAVOC is Ursa Major’s first All-Up Round entry. It is a medium-range hypersonic missile combining a Lynx solid rocket booster for initial acceleration with the Draper liquid engine for sustained hypersonic flight.

The Munitions Industrial Base has focused heavily on a single misleading metric: the number of solid rocket motor manufacturers. According to a 2017 Congressional Research Service report, the number of major SRM suppliers shrank from six in 1995 to just two or three by 2017. 

In response, the Pentagon has pursued funding more manufacturers, Anduril, for example, has entered the SRM space with $43.7 million aimed at boosting domestic production. 

But this approach fails to address the actual problem.

Traditional SRM companies operate like automakers: they assemble complex systems from a network of first-, second-, and third-tier suppliers. Over the past two decades, that sub-tier supply chain collapsed from 5,000 suppliers to just 1,000. 

Simply Adding 100 more manufacturers at the top of the funnel won't solve the problem.  It spreads the same dwindling pool of materials thinner. And every manufacturer in the ecosystem still depends on a single domestic supplier of Ammonium Perchlorate, the primary oxidizer in virtually every U.S. military SRM.

Ursa Major's model offers a different approach. Rather than competing for the same limited sub-tier suppliers, it bypasses key bottlenecks through two pillars of vertical integration:

There is a common critique that vertical integration undercuts small suppliers by capturing revenue they would otherwise receive. In a healthy, high-capacity supply chain, that argument has merit. However, in the constrained SRM industry, vertical integration could actually expand overall capacity. 

Consider a legacy machine shop producing 100 nozzles per year. If that capacity is split between two prime customers, the bottleneck remains for both. If one customer vertically integrates and prints its own nozzles, the shop's full capacity is now available to everyone else, effectively expanding total industry output without any new infrastructure investment.

Vertical integration in this environment doesn't shrink the supply chain. It relieves pressure on the parts of it that are most constrained.

The Pentagon's instinct to fund more SRM manufacturers is understandable but incomplete. Adding producers at the top of a collapsed supply chain doesn't solve the shortage, rather it redistributes it. Ursa Major's vertical integration model addresses the problem differently, bypassing the sub-tier bottlenecks that constrain every other producer in the ecosystem.

The caveat is execution. Ursa Major's most important near-term milestone is the transition of the Mk 104 pathfinder into a production contract. If the Navy moves from maturing the Lynx process to issuing a multi-year production agreement, Ursa Major crosses from development-stage supplier to qualified production source for one of the fleet's most critical interceptor programs.